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Abstract. Regulation may give rise to corrupt practices thereby resulting in welfare loss in an economy. 
This research aims at measuring the impact of corruption on the real estate sector of Dhaka city, the 
capital of Bangladesh. It makes an attempt to measure the welfare loss resulting from corrupt practices 
exercised mainly by government regulatory agencies. Bribe and extortion fee are the two main indica-
tors whereby welfare loss is measured. Evidence from the study reveals that around 8 floors are lost due 
to payment of bribe and other such payments.
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introduction
Corruption is a much-discussed topic in Bangladesh in recent years. After being rated 
as one of the most corrupt countries of the world for several successive years by the 
Transparency International, there has been a heightened awareness about it. To fight 
against corruption governments generally consider tighter control and prosecution as 
effective means. Such regulations, however, may culminate in more corruption instead 
of reducing it (Haque & Muzaffar, 2008). The present study on the real estate sector 
of Dhaka city makes an attempt to investigate corruption that exists in the regulatory 
bodies and tries to quantify the economic loss associated with corrupt practices.
Corruption is defined as the use of public power to obtain private profit, preferment 
or prestige or for benefit of a group or class in a way that constitutes a breach of law 
or standard of high moral conduct (UNESCO, 1974). The Anti-Corruption Act of 
1947 (Section 161) defines bribery as the gratification other than remuneration for 
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doing or forbearing to do or for showing or forbearing to show favor or disfavor to 
any person (cited in Mansur, 2000). In common usage the word corruption is used 
to mean different things in different contexts. In this paper corruption mainly refers 
to taking bribe and extortion fee. The process of bribery brings two parties together 
who have the intension to engage in some form of illegal transaction between them 
for a consideration that benefits or promises to benefit the public servant. The benefits 
received by the payee may be legal or illegal. In certain cases, bribe may turn out to be a 
de facto payment or a payment parallel to the legal fee (Muzaffar, 1999).
Despite the fact that corruption is a significant problem in many of the developing 
countries, combating corruption has proved to be very difficult in most cases. In as 
much as it creates of burden of tax on public services and private activities, it also leads 
to potentially severe efficiency consequences (Krueger, 1974; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; 
Bertrand et al., 2006). Limited access to information on corruption by the citizens of 
the country is one potential reason for persistent corruption (Olken, 2009). Accurate 
information on corruption, as Olken (2009) suggests, may help prevent it through 
democratic process, providing incentives for politicians to limit it. Findings from Billger 
& Goel (2009) suggest that blanket corruption control policies are unlikely to succeed 
equally across countries with different corruption levels.
The transition of the countries from a poor, stand-still, traditional society to a 
rich, modern, market democracy may also help explain the pattern of corruption. 
According to Hofstaedter (1948), corruption in the US grew to reach a peak about 
a century ago, but since then it has fallen steadily, as predicted by the transition 
hypothesis (Paldam, 2002). Economic chaos may cause corruption as in the case of 
Russia where state of corruption deteriorated in previous decades (Levin & Satarov, 
2000 cited in Paldam, 2002). Khan (1998) investigates the issue of corruption in 
the Indian subcontinent, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea and using a patron 
client network model tries to explain why in some countries corruption has attended 
rapid growth while in others it has implied transfers which are very damaging for 
growth. Dreher et al. (2007), using a structural equation model, provide a ranking of 
the countries showing Switzerland, Japan, Norway, Denmark, Germany among the 
least corrupt countries while Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Syria, Zambia, Ghana among 
the most corrupt countries.
Real estate can be considered as an economic good since it is scarce in nature 
(Brueggeman & Fisher, 2002). The scarcity in turn may give rise to corrupt practices. 
Although real estate may have many dimensions, this study only considers the 
construction aspect of the real estate sector. This sector in Bangladesh has been one of 
the fastest growing sectors since the 1990s and has helped provide housing facilities to 
the urban dwellers and create employment in both formal and informal sectors of the 
economy through its forward and backward linkages.
Dhaka, the capital city of Bangladesh, has witnessed a large influx of people over the 
past decades, becoming one of the fastest growing and densely populated cities in the 
region. Access to proper housing facilities is an acute problem for its large number of 
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inhabitants. The growth in the apartment units delivered shows a moderate pace since the 
mid 1990s, considered as insufficient to meet the growing demand for housing facilities 
(Figure 1). A conducive business environment is important for the development of real 
estate sector thus assisting in alleviating the housing problem.
a review of related Literature
Evidence of written work on corruption can be as ancient as “Arthasastra” by Kautiliya 
in the fourth century B. C. in India, identifying the irresistible temptation by the 
government servants to receive bribe (cited in Bardhan, 1997). Oldenburg (1987) 
argues that corruption has always been present, in different forms, having an adverse 
effect in different times at different places with varying degree and consequences. 
Government institutions which are corrupt and malfunctioning may impede or 
protract investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation (Lien, 1986). Bardhan (1997) 
points out that persistent corruption in certain cases may result into a sense of despair 
and helplessness amongst people who are concerned with it and ultimately turning the 
country into a mafia state. Corruption may lead to lower economic growth (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1993) and the country’s growth may slow down where people with talent 
are engaged in rent seeking activities (Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Limiting 
corruption might be a difficult task where it is economically desirable (Rose-Ackerman, 
1978). Taslim (1994) argues that corruption in the form of bribe taking is like sand in 
a machine rather than oil because it drives out firms with lower entrepreneurial skills 
from the market (cited in Khan & Toufique, 1995). 
On the other hand, several studies provide evidence of positive consequences of 
corruption. Mauro (1993) suggests that corruption may raise economic growth in two 
ways: by acting as a speed money allowing individuals to overcome bureaucratic delays 
and by making government officials work harder leading to a greater efficiency. Khan 
(1998) states that in some North East Asian countries such as South Korea widespread 
corruption has accompanied decades of very high growth. 
FIGURE 1: Growth rate of apartment units delivered in Dhaka city
Source: Various issues of REHAB newsletters and publications.
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Bhadra & Bhadra (1997) argue for legalizing bribery. Since South Asia as a 
whole typically ranks high on surveys designed to measure the extent of bribery and 
corruption in business, their argument is that it is neither moral nor efficient to keep a 
widely prevalent system under the rug (Bhadra & Bhadra, 1997). The paper by Haque 
& Muzaffar (2008) searches for a rationality of paying bribe and using data from the 
real estate sector of Bangladesh measures the loss to the government as a result of 
corruption.
The research method
In order to measure the welfare loss due to corruption which in turn results from 
regulations and extortion, the research makes an attempt to collect information on 
completed projects of real estate companies in Dhaka city. A structured questionnaire 
was designed to collect data relating to payment of legal fee, bribe, extortion fee, and 
other such information. A number of government agencies are identified from the study 
of Haque & Muzaffar (2008), responsible for providing different kinds of permission to 
the builders of apartments. These include:
Design: The design of the project needs approval from the regulatory agency called 
RAJUK (Dhaka Development Authority).
Water,  Gas,  and Electricity: To supply the utility services such as water, gas, 
and electricity a builder requires to take permission from Dhaka WASA (Dhaka Water 
Supply Authority), TITAS Gas Supply and Distribution, and Dhaka Electric Supply 
Authority (DESA) respectively.
Leaving equipment on the roadside: In order to leave the construction 
equipment, such as rods, bricks, and cement, on the roads adjacent to the construction 
site, the builder needs a temporary permission from the Dhaka City Corporation.
Hand-over of  the apartment to the client: At the time of hand over of 
apartments to flat-owners, the builder sometimes requires to pay a fee on the basis of 
per square foot to RAJUK. This fee sometimes is paid by the flat-owners depending on 
how the contract is signed.
Registration of  the project: The Registry Office located at Tejgaon, Dhaka charges 
a fee from the builder at the time of registration process.
Value added tax (VAT): The builder needs to pay VAT at 3% rate of the apartment 
price quoted when the hand-over is done. The agency responsible for collecting the 
VAT is the Circle Zone Office at Shegunbagicha, Dhaka.
Apart from the above government regulatory agencies where payment of legal fee 
and bribe (the possibility of it) is involved during the completion of a project, the other 
two areas where a builder might require to pay bribe or extortion fee are the police and 
local extortionists (the “mastans”).
Using the structured questionnaire a survey was conducted during the months 
of November and December 2008 on companies, enlisted with the Real Estate and 
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Housing Association of Bangladesh (REHAB), in Dhaka city. Although a random 
selection process of companies was followed, collection of information was possible 
only from the companies who were willing to respond and provide such data. The data 
was analyzed using spreadsheet and software such as SPSS.
The Theoretical model
The model used for the purpose of analysis assumes that a builder has a marginal cost 
(MC) curve which is also its supply function in a perfectly competitive market. The 
existence of a large number of builders in the city of Dhaka supports the notion of a 
competitive market. Figure 2 shows marginal cost curves with bribe and without bribe, 
MC1 and MC2 respectively. MC1 is constructed using the data collected from the field 
survey while MC2 is an estimated function. The area of the triangle ABF measures the 
welfare loss.
Welfare loss = ½ × Difference in MC Curves × Difference in quantities
To derive the marginal cost functions it is assumed that the cost function for 
constructing the apartments is as follows: 
C = C (Q, R, F), 
where C is the cost of apartment construction, Q is the area of the apartment measured 
in square foot, R stands for bribe and extortion fee paid, and F refers to legal fee.
FIGURE 2: Measuring Welfare Loss Using Marginal Cost Curves
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The research findings
The survey reveals information on 27 completed projects, 21 residential and 6 
commercial, of the companies who were willing to provide data (Table 1). 
Table 2 provides information on payment of bribe and extortion fee during the course 
of the completion of the projects.  It shows that in 77.8% cases the builder requires to 
pay bribe to RAJUK for the approval of the project design. It also depicts a high degree 
of corruption while paying for taking connection for utility services. The figures show 
that in 100 percent cases builders need to 
pay bribe in order to obtain permission for 
water and electricity. In contrast, as Table 
2 suggests, reported cases of payment of 
bribe and extortion fee for VAT, police, 
and local extortionists are relatively low.
Table 3 states the reasons for paying 
bribe or extortion fee. 25.9% of the cases 
report that the reason behind paying bribe 
is to speed up the process. 3.7% say that it 
is a necessity, in other words, without the 
TABLE 1: nature of the project
type frequency
Residential 21
(77.8)
Commercial 6
(22.2)
Total 27
Source: Field survey, November and December 
2008. NB: Figures within parentheses show 
percentage of the total.
TABLE 2: payment of bribe
areas where legal fee or bribe,  
extortion fee was paid
Bribe/extortion fee paid
Yes No
Design 21
(77.8)
6
(22.2)
Water 27
(100)
0
(0)
Gas 24
(88.9)
3
(11.1)
Electricity 27
(100)
0
(0)
Use of adjacent road 17
(63)
10
(37)
Registration 23
(85.2)
4
(14.8)
VAT 3
(11.1)
24
(88.9)
Mafia fee to the extortionists 9
(33.3)
18
(66.7)
Illegal payment to the Police 4
(14.8)
23
(85.2)
Total number of responses 27
Source: Field survey November and December 2008. NB: Figures within parentheses show  per-
centage of total. The item hand-over is not shown since no information was revealed in this  regard.
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bribe the respective work would not have been done. 63% state both of the factors as a 
reason. 
According to Table 4, 81.5% of the cases report that they performed the process of 
giving bribe through a package deal while 11.1% say that it was done through a personal 
effort from desk to desk.
Table 5 states that 40.7% of the total number of projects paid the bribe in two 
installments, 29.6% of them paid in 3 installments, and 18.5% of them paid in 4 
installments. Only 3% of total paid the whole sum before the job was done. 
TABLE 3: reasons for payment of bribe/extortion fee
reasons frequency percentage (%)
To speed up the process 7 25.9
It was a necessity 1 3.7
Speedup + Necessity 17 63.0
Others 2 7.4
Total 27 100
Source: Field survey, November and December 2008.
TABLE 4: type of deal to pay bribe/extortion fee
type frequency percentage (%)
Package 22 81.5
Personal 3 11.1
Both 2 7.4
Total 27 100
Source: Field survey, November and December 2008.
TABLE 5: mode of payment of bribe/extortion fee
number of installments frequency percentage (%)
In 2 Installments 11 40.7
In 3 Installments 8 29.6
In 4 Installments 5 18.5
Payment before the work done 3 11.1
Total 27 100
Source: Field survey, November and December 2008.
The paper uses the following cost function for estimation.
Log C = 9.364 + 7.84E-06 Q + 1.16E-11 R × Q + 8.24E-13 F × Q
Std error: (0.255)  (7.64E-06)  (3.27E-12)      (3.13E-13)
t stat:         (36.67)         (1.02)         (3.54)               (2.63)
n: 27       R2 = 0.6138                  Adjusted R2 = 0.5612
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Here, C stands for cost in thousand taka, Q is area in square foot, R stands for bribe paid 
because of regulation, and F stands for Fee that is required as a legal payment.
The cost function has a constant term since not all cases report of paying bribe and 
also there is a fixed cost involved. The coefficient of Q is positive reflecting the fact that 
higher level of production would lead to higher cost. The coefficient of (R×Q) is positive 
revealing that cost increases as bribe and extortion fee associated with tighter regulation 
goes up. The coefficient of (F×Q) is positive as higher fee leads to greater costs.
A summary of the results estimated is provided in Table 6. The average values for 
Marginal cost with bribe and without bribe are approximately Taka 832 and Taka 545 
respectively thus implying that the burden is Taka 287. The results also show that on 
average 8 floors are lost due to payment of bribe and welfare loss per square foot is 
552.89.
TABLE 6: summary of findings
mean median max min std Dev
Cost of the project (in lac) 338.89 260 250 27 233.78
Area (Q) 33367.48 33600 100800 8400 21645.66
Bribe/extortion fee 593611.11 491000 1578000 21000 473449
Legal fee 5111046.56 3875000 18310200 76000 5048612.46
Marginal cost with bribe/
extortion fee
831.78 575.87 3330.56 39.41 822.78
Marginal cost without 
bribe/extortion fee
544.72 362.48 1989.26 32.90 476.88
Area (Q) without bribe/
extortion fee
46959.58 46025.78 122041.58 8475.97 25681.24
Differences in Areas (Q) 13592.10 14408.13 25457.29 75.97 6353.06
Welfare loss 2505045.31 1223269.86 13015180.39 39.89 3494654.41
Average floor lost 7.9259 - - - -
Welfare loss per square foot 552.89 - - - -
Source: Data collected from field survey and calculation by the author. NB: Figures expressed in 
Bangladesh currency Taka; 1 Dollar = 70 Taka (approx.); 10 lac = 1 million.
Concluding remarks
The paper provides information on taking bribes in government regulatory agencies 
and the amount of loss incurred as a result of it. The primary objective of the study was 
to show a quantitative measure of welfare loss studied in economic literature. Despite 
several limitations, such as information on a few completed projects and availability of 
confidential data, the study reveals evidence of significant amount of welfare loss in the 
construction of apartments in Dhaka city. Perhaps what is required is to identify critical 
governance capacities of the institutions and set realistic and feasible institutional 
reforms and anti-corruption strategies to combat corrupt practices.
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